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Walking a Thin Blue Line: 
Balancing the Citizen's Right to Record Police 
Officers Against Officer Privacy 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One bystander with a cell phone can change an individual's en-
counter with law enforcement from an unprovable allegation of 
abuse to a media sensation. Audio and video recording, a capability 
in nearly every American's pocket, has changed the way that citizens 
interact with police officers. Today, the technology that immortalized 
the police beating of Rodney King exposes excessive force used on 
the Occupy Wall Street protestors, 1 monitors the actions of officers 
making arrests, 2 and allows individuals to memorialize their conver-
sations with investigators.3 Recordings of law enforcement activity 
create not only clear evidentiary accounts that benefit victims and 
innocent police officers, but also strengthen incentives for law en-
forcement to use only reasonable force or risk being exposed to the 
media, facing professional discipline, or even prosecution. Com-
pelled by these public policy considerations, most states have enact-
ed statutes to protect the recording rights of citizens. However, 
many recorders find out too late that they have recorded a police of-
ficer in the wrong state and, when they attempt to use their record-
ings to expose questionable behavior, are arrested themselves. 
Federal and state anti-wiretapping and anti-eavesdropping stat-
utes are primarily designed to protect the privacy rights of those 
whose conversations might be recorded without their knowledge. 
However, these same statutes can often have consequences that 
reach far beyond this well-meaning goal. In many instances, law en-
forcement officers can utilize these statutes to arrest citizens that are 
l. Ginia Bellafante, Every Action Produces Overreaction, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2011, at MBl; 
jennifer Medina, California's Campus Movements Dig In Their Heels, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2011, at 
A17. 
2. Don Terry, Eavesdropping Laws Mean That Turning On an Audio Recorder Could Send You to 
Prison, N.Y. TIMES, jan. 23, 2011, at A29B (describing a street artist who recorded his arrest for 
selling art without a permit). 
3. Id. (describing a woman who recorded her interactions with police investigators while 
filing a sexual harassment complaint against another police officer). 
183 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
recording the officers' interactions with the public. The ostensible 
purpose of this application is to protect the safety and privacy of the 
police officers. 
When statutes are interpreted in this way, they spill beyond the 
bounds of individual privacy and begin to invade the First Amend-
ment speech rights of the public. As written, many state recording 
statutes demonstrably violate the First Amendment. Others can be 
applied to violate those rights. This Comment argues that in order to 
strike an appropriate balance between First Amendment speech 
rights and the strong public interest in protecting police safety and 
privacy, state legislatures should amend these eavesdropping stat-
utes to include a strong rebuttable presumption in favor of the citi-
zen recorder. Underlying this rebuttable presumption is the argu-
ment that when police officers act in their official capacity, the public 
policy reasons behind protecting an individual's privacy are dimin-
ished and ultimately outweighed by the incentives to encourage free 
speech. The presumption against the officer would not be absolute: 
in cases where the interest in officer privacy and protection are very 
strong and outweigh free speech concerns, the officer may have the 
opportunity to rebut the presumption in court. 
Part II of this Comment will review the relevant state statutory 
and case law that has led to inconsistent rules and has resulted in 
free speech violations. Part III will address the tension between pro-
tecting First Amendment rights and the value of protecting police of-
ficers and will explain when it is appropriate for each to be impaired 
for the sake of the other. Part IV will explain the need for and bene-
fits of a rebuttable presumption against police privacy. Part V con-
cludes. 
II. BACKGROUND 
An individual's right to record an encounter with a police officer 
depends largely on the state recording statute where the encounter 
occurs, the state case law interpreting the recording statute, and the 
constitutional rules adopted by the applicable circuit court. The 
combination of these legal rules often leads to ambiguity. This Part 
will explain the varying rules that have been adopted by states as 
well as recount the major statutory interpretations of the laws by 
both state and federal courts. 
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A. Variation in State Statutory Law 
Recording statutes, generally characterized as prohibitions on 
wiretapping or eavesdropping, vary widely across states, with some 
more likely to favor the citizen and some more likely to favor the po-
lice officer. Within this variation, the statutes tend to fall into a few 
distinct categories.4 The majority of state statutes, as well as the fed-
eral recording statute, fall into the first category, which permits rec-
orded conversations where at least one of the parties to the conver-
sation agrees to the recording. 5 These "one-party consent" statutes 
4. For a detailed explanation of the differences between the federal and state privacy 
statutes, see jesse Harlan Alderman, Police Privacy in the iPhone Era?: The Need for Safeguards in State 
Wiretapping Statutes to Preserve the Civilian's Right to Record Public Police Activity, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. 
REV. 487,489-511 (2011). 
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2511 (2012) (it is not unlawful to intercept a communication 
"where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the commu-
nication has given prior consent to such interception"); ALA. CODE§ 13A-11-30 (2011) ("eaves-
dropping" is recording "without the consent of at least one of the persons engaged in the com-
munication"); ALASKA STAT. § 42.20.310 (2011) (prohibiting recording "without the consent of a 
party to the conversation"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3005 (2011) (felonious to intercept a 
conversation "without the consent of a party to such conversation or discussion"); ARK. CODE 
AN:--1. § 5-60-120 (2011) (unlawful to intercept "unless the person is a party to the communica-
tion or one (I) of the parties to the communication has given prior consent"); CoLo. REV. STAT. 
§ 18-9-304 (2011) (eavesdropping is recording "without the consent of at least one of the princi-
pal parties thereto"); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-187 (2011) ("wiretapping" is recording without 
the consent of at least one party); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2402 (201]) (lawful to intercept a 
communication "where one of the parties . has given prior consent"); HAw. REV. STilT. § 
803-42 (2011) (not unlawful to record "when the person is a party ... or when one of the par-
ties . has given prior consent"); IDAHO CODF ANN. § 18-6702 (201]) (lawful to intercept 
when "when one (I) of the parties . has given prior consent"); 2012 Ind. Acts 1781 ( "inter-
ception" is a recording by someone "other than a sender or receiver" or "without the consent of 
the sender or receiver"); IOWA CoDF § 727.8 (2011) ("the sender or recipient of a message or one 
who is openly present and participating in or listening to a communication shall not be prohibit-
ed hereby from recording such message or communication"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6101 (2011) 
(breach of privacy is intercepting a communication "without the confent of the sender or receiv-
er"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 526.010 (West 201 1) (defining eavesdropping as recording "without 
the consent of at least one (1) party thereto"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 15:1303 (2011) (not unlaw-
ful when "such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties ... has 
given prior consent"); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 1 7-A, § 511 (2011) (using a recording device "without 
the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy" is a violation of privacy); MINN. STAT.§ 
626A.02 (2011) (not unlawful when "such person is a party to the communication or where one 
of the parties .. has given prior consent"); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 41-29-531 (20 11) (actor is 
immune from civil liability if "the person is a party to the communication, or if one (1) of the 
parties . has given prior consent"); Mo. REV. STAT.§ 542.402 (2011) (not unlawful when 
"such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties ... has given prior 
consent"); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 86-290 (2011) (not unlawful when "such person is a party to the 
communication or when one of the parties ... has given prior consent"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
200.620 (2011) (unlawful unless "the interception or attempted interception is made with the 
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are unlikely to be used to arrest the recorder because the recorder is 
often one of the parties to the conversation and is therefore specifi-
cally protected by the statutes.6 
Several states, however, have statutes that only permit record-
ings of oral conversations if all parties to the conversation consent to 
the recording. 7 Among these "two-party consent" statutes, there are 
varying methods to determine which conversations are protected. In 
some states, the anti-recording statute only applies to conversations 
prior consent of one of the parties to the communication"); N.j. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-4 
(West 2011) (not unlawful when "such person is a party to the communication or one of the 
parties ... has given prior consent); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-12-1 (201 I) (interference with 
communications includes recording "without the consent of a sender or intended recipient 
thereof"); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.00 (McKinney 201 1) (defining "wiretapping," "mechanical 
overhearing," and "intercepting or accessing of an electronic communication" in terms of an ab .. 
sence of the consent of at least one party); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 15A-287 (2011) (recording "with-
out the consent of at least one party to the communication" constitutes a felony); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2933.52 (West 2011) (statute doesn't apply when the "person is a party to the 
communication or if one of the parties ... has given the person prior consent"); OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 13, §176.4 (2011) (not unlawful when "such person is a party to the communication or when 
one of the parties ... has given prior consent"); OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540 (2011) (may not 
record "unless consent is given by at least one participant"); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 11-35-21 (2011) 
(not unlawful when "the person is a party to the communication, or one of the parties ... has 
given prior consent"); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 17-30-30 (2011) (lawful when "the person is a party to 
the communication or where one of the parties ... has given prior consent"); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAws§ 23A-35A-20 (2011) (person who is "[n]ot a sender or receiver" and records a conversa-
tion "without the consent of either a sender or receiver" is guilty of a felony); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 39-13-601 (2011) (lawful where "the person is a party to the communication or one of the par-
ties ... has given prior consent"); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.§ 16.02 (West 201 I) (a person who 
records has an affirmative defense where "the person is a party to the communication; or one of 
the parties ... has given prior consent"); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 77-23a-4 (West 2011) (may rec-
ord when "one of the parties ... has given prior consent"); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-62 (2011) ( 
not an offense where "such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties ... 
has given prior consent"); W.VA. CODE§ 62-10-3 (2011) (lawful to record where not unlawful 
when "the person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties ... has given 
prior consent"); WIS. STAT. § 968.31 (2011) (not unlawful when "the person is a party to the 
communication or where one of the parties ... has given prior consent"); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 
7-3-702 (2011) (does not prohibit recording "where one (I) of the parties to the communication 
has given prior consent to the interception"). 
6. It is important to note, however, that under these statutes many valuable recordings 
could not be made by bystanders witnessing police abuse, such as the video of the Rodney King 
beating. In Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79-80 (1st Cir. 2011), a case that will be explained in more 
detail, Simon Glik recorded a police interaction as a bystander and was arrested for it. Recently, 
activists in New York City have begun systematically recording police officers engaging in contro-
versial "stop-and-frisk" practices in order to attract attention to alleged police misconduct. See, e.g., 
Kia Gregory,A Watcher of the Police Says He is Now a Target, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2012, at A2l. 
7. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-11-62 (2011) (unlawful to record "without the consent 
of all persons observed"). 
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where the participants have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 8 The 
Massachusetts9 and Montana 10 legislatures have determined that in-
stead of using a reasonable expectation of privacy standard, the line 
between protected and unprotected communications is drawn by de-
termining whether the recording is made surreptitiously or openly. 11 
Washington requires both privacy and secrecy before the recording 
will be prohibited. 12 The two-party recording statute in Illinois is 
unique, and undoubtedly the harshest in the country. Containing no 
explicit expectation of privacy or secrecy requirement, the Illinois re-
8. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 632 (West 2011) (protects "confidential communications," which 
are defined as those communications "carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate 
that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes 
a communication made in . . circumstances in which the parties to the communication may 
reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded"); FLA. STAT.§ 934.02 
(2011) ("oral communication" is "uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such com-
munication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifYing such expectation"); MD. 
CODE ANN., CTS. &jUD. PROC. § 10-401 (West 2011) ("'oral communication' means any conver-
sation or words spoken to or by any person in private conversation"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 
750.539c (West 2011) (protects "private conversation[s]"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:1 
(2011) (protects oral communication "uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such 
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifYing such expectation"); 
N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-15-04 (2011) (protects oral communication "uttered by a person exhib-
iting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances 
justifYing such expectation"); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 5702 (West 2011) (oral communication 
only protected if the person uttering it possesses an expectation that the communication is not 
subject to interception under circumstances justifYing such expectation); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9.73.030 (West 2011) (protects "private communication" and "private conversation"). 
9. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2011) ("interception" means to "secretly 
hear, secretly record, or aid another to secretly hear or secretly record"). 
10. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (2011) (statute applies to a person who "records or 
causes to be recorded a conversation by use of a hidden electronic or mechanical device that re-
produces a human conversation without the knowledge of all parties to the conversation"). 
11. This statutory scheme does not necessarily reject the reasonable expectation of priva-
cy theory. It follows that if a party to the conversation can see that his confidant is holding are-
cording device, his subjective expectation of privacy, if he continues to have the expectation, is 
unlikely to be a "reasonable" expectation. However, by identifying the lack of privacy as the visi-
bility of the recording device, the statutes curtail other factors that may destroy an expectation 
of privacy. For example, if two people are having an audible conversation on an open street or in 
a crowded room but do not see a recording device, their conversation cannot be recorded, even 
though they have clearly forfeited their right to privacy in other Constitutional contexts. See Katz 
v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (for purposes of Fourth Amendment privacy from govern-
ment intrusion, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or of-
fice," is not protected by privacy, "[b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected"). 
12. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030 (West 2011) (consent is considered to have been 
obtained when one party has announced to all other parties that the conversation is about to be 
recorded). 
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cording statute requires the consent of all parties and protects abso-
lutely all conversations. 13 In People v. Beardsley, the Illinois Supreme 
Court interpreted the recording statute to include a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy requirement when an arrestee was convicted af-
ter recording the officers in the front seat while he was in the back of 
the squad car. 14 The court believed that the statute must have been 
"based on the assumption that if the parties to a conversation act 
under circumstances which entitle them to believe that the conversa-
tion is private and cannot be heard by others who are acting in a law-
ful manner, then they should be protected in their privacy." 15 The 
Illinois legislature then amended the statute to make it clear that no 
expectation of privacy analysis should be used, and overruled Beards-
ley. It defined a "conversation" as "any oral communication between 
2 or more persons regardless of whether one or more of the parties in-
tended their communication to be of a private nature under circum-
stances justifying that expectation." 16 
The next section will explain the consequences of these statutes. 
In most states, the state manages to promote its interest in officer 
safety without burdening speech rights more than is necessary. 
However, the outliers, Massachusetts and Illinois, which have 
bright-line rules with no reasonable expectation of privacy require-
ment, have proven themselves too ripe for potential police abuse to 
comfortably fall within constitutional confines. 
B. Variations in State Case Law 
State recording statutes have been applied in a number of varying 
factual situations. Some are situations where it is clear that the pub-
lic has no compelling interest in protecting the officers, while in oth-
ers the case is a much closer call. Between the various state statutes 
and their interpretive cases, many inconsistencies have developed 
that result in a body of case law that is unlikely to be helpful to citi-
zens in understanding their rights. 
13. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2 (2011) ("A person commits eavesdropping when 
he ... [k]nowingly and intentionally uses an eavesdropping device for the purpose of hearing 
or recording all or any part of any conversation ... unless he does so . . . with the consent of 
all of the parties to such conversation . . ."). 
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1. Difficulty defining "reasonable expectation of privacy" 
The factual circumstances of the recorded conversation play an 
integral part in determining if a party has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. For example, a recording of a police officer's conversation 
did not violate the state's wire-tapping statute in Commonwealth v. 
Henlen because of the non-private nature of the conversation. 17 In 
this case out of Pennsylvania, a state in which recording is allowed 
unless the officer has a reasonable expectation of privacy, a state 
trooper interviewed a prison guard who secretly recorded an inter-
view and was subsequently charged. 18 However, because police gen-
erally record such interviews, and because the trooper took notes 
during the interview in question and allowed a third party to be pre-
sent, the court concluded that the trooper did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 19 
In applying a reasonable expectation of privacy standard, the 
court determines on a case-by-case basis whether the police officer 
could have expected the conversation to be kept private. Because this 
analysis is fact specific, as the facts of cases become less clear, de-
termining which conversations are private becomes more complicat-
ed. In another case, in which it was clear that the police officers did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy,20 the court acknowl-
edged that there are some "close case[s]." The court suggested that 
protecting law enforcement agents may justify the arrest of a citizen 
that is recording police activity in situations where the police have to 
make "split-second decisions ... in the heat of dangerous or po-
tentially dangerous confrontation."21 This suggestion by Pennsylva-
nia courts is troubling, because the dangerousness of the situation 
likely has little correlation to the level of privacy that an officer can 
reasonably expect. This leaves open two possible situations where 
police can arrest citizen recorders: (1) when the confrontation occurs 
in a place where the police officer has a stronger expectation of pri-
17. 564 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1989). 
18. Id. at 905. 
19. Id. at 906. 
20. Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 539 (E.D. Pa. 2005). The arrestee in this 
case videotaped state police as they performed truck inspections on a public highway because he 
was concerned the inspections were being conducted in an unsafe manner. He was "some 20 to 
30 feet back from the highway at all relevant times and never interfered with the activities of the 
troopers." Id. 
21. Id. at 545. 
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vacy than he would in a police-recorded interview or during police 
action on a public highway (although it is unclear how much strong-
er the expectation must be) and (2) where an ill-defined "dangerous 
situation" justifies the arrest. 22 
In contrast to Pennsylvania, courts in Washington have inter-
preted their reasonable expectation of privacy requirement more de-
finitively.23 For example, in Washington v. Flora, a man claimed that 
he had been "handled roughly" and had been the subject of racial 
slurs during his arrest.24 During a subsequent encounter with the 
police, he recorded the conversation with a small tape recorder hid-
den among a stack of papers, because "he feared the deputies would 
assault him and use racial slurs as they had done in the past."25 The 
officers discovered the recording device and arrested him for violat-
ing Washington's recording statute.26 In ruling for the arrestee, the 
court reasoned that the statute only protected "private conversa-
tions," holding that statements made while effectuating arrests are 
per se not private.27 The officers had no reasonable expectation that 
the conversation was private because the arrest was on a public 
street, within the presence of third parties, and within earshot of 
passersby.28 The court explicitly stated an intention to keep the stat-
ute from becoming a tool of police abuse, declaring, "We decline the 
State's invitation to transform the privacy act into a sword available 
for use against individuals by public officers acting in their official 
capacity."29 
While Flora only analyzed conversations made during the course 
of an arrest, a subsequent case made it clear that the rule from Flora 
should be applied more expansively.30 In johnson v. Hawe, a teenager 
videotaped a police officer speaking on a radio with his window 
down in a parking lot. 31 The recording in johnson, unlike the record-
22. !d. at 539, 545 (acknowledging that in a "close case" where the police officer would 
have to make a "split second decision ... in the heat of a dangerous or potentially dangerous 
confrontation," it may be appropriate to prohibit citizen recorders). 
23. See State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 
24. Id. at 1355. 
25. Id. at 1356. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 1357-58. 
28. Id. at 1357. 
29. Id. at 1358. 
30. See johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2004). 
31. Id. at 679-80. 
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ing in Flora, was not of a conversation between the teenager and the 
officer, but rather between the officer and a third party.32 Neverthe-
less, the Ninth Circuit said that the language from Flora "does not 
exclude any conduct other than an actual arrest, but encompasses 
other conduct that is public and official."33 
The Washington interpretive scheme is likely the best at protect-
ing both the free speech rights of civilians and the privacy rights of 
police when an expectation of privacy is justified. However, the rule 
still depends on whether the conduct was "public and official."34 
While this standard may be generally easy to apply, police often en-
gage in conduct that is somewhere in between clearly official or un-
official. This gray area of police conduct may lead to uncertainty, 
which likely continues to be the source of unnecessary litigation and 
chills citizens from exercising their free speech rights. 
2. Drawing a line between "hidden" and "open" recording 
The Massachusetts wiretap statute, which prohibits recordings 
when they are made in "secret,"35 has spawned a series of highly con-
troversial cases that raise logistical and constitutional concerns. In 
1998, Michael Hyde was stopped by officers, who ordered him out of 
his car, frisked him, examined some of the contents of the car, and 
asked him if he was carrying drugs.36 The stop quickly became con-
frontational.37 Six days later, H~de went to the police station to file a 
complaint against the officers. 8 To substantiate his claim, he pro-
duced a tape recording he had surreptitiously made with a recorder in 
his pocket.39 Rather than investigating his claim, authorities charged 
Hyde with wiretapping.40 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts interpreted the privacy statute as unambiguous, and noted that 
there is "no exception for a private individual who secretly records the 
oral communications of public officials."41 The court expressly de-
32. Id. 
33. Id.at 683. 
34. Id. 
35. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 292, § 99(C) (1) (2011). 
36. Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 964 (Mass. 2001). 
37. Id. 
38. I d. at 965. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 966. 
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dined to interpret the statute with any regard for whether the police 
officers had a reasonable expectation of privacy, reasoning that the 
plain language of the statute turned on whether or not the intercep-
tion was made secretly.42 Hyde was "not prosecuted for making the 
recording; he was prosecuted for doing so secretly.'.43 
Several years later, Simon Glik was on Boston Common and saw 
several police officers arresting a young man. 44 Glik was 
" [ c] oncerned that the officers were employing excessive force to ef-
fect the arrest," so he used the camera on his cell phone to record 
the exchange. 45 An officer asked him if he was recording audio, Glik 
said that he was, and he was arrested for violating the wiretapping 
statute.46 The charges were eventually dismissed because "the law 
requires a secret recording and the officers admitted that Glik had 
used his cell phone openly and in plain view."47 
3. Enforcing a citizen's right to record 
After his charges were dropped, Simon Glik brought a claim 
against the officers and the city of Boston under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.48 Section 1983 provides an action for civil damages when an 
officer acting under the color of state law deprives a citizen of a con-
stitutional right. 49 In order for an officer to be personally liable in 
the suit, it must have been "clearly established" by the case law at 
the time that the officer's conduct was a violation of the citizen's 
constitutional rights. 50 The First Circuit ultimately determined that 
the officers had violated Glik's clearly established Fourth Amend-
ment rights to be free from unreasonable seizure as well as his First 
Amendment rights to film police officersY The seizure of his person 
and camera was unreasonable, because Glik did not fall within the 
ambit of the statute, as his recording was open and not secret.52 
42. Id. at 967--68. 
43. !d. at 969. 
44. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78,79 (1st Cir. 2011). 
45. Id. at 79-80. 
46. !d. at 80. 
47. Id. (emphasis added). 
48. ld. 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
50. Harlowv. Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800,818 (1982). 
51. Glik, 655 F. 3d at 79. 
52. Id. at 86-87. 
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Glik's First Amendment rights, however, did not depend on whether 
the recording was open or secret. Instead, the court affirmed that 
there is "a constitutionally frotected right to videotape police carrying 
out their duties in public"5 and that Glik "fell well within the bounds 
of the Constitution's protections."54 The court did not comment on 
whether Glik would still have been within these constitutional bounds 
if, like Hyde, his cell phone had been concealed. The court suggested, 
without analysis, that there may be situations where a right exists, but 
a "time, place, and manner" restriction would be appropriate. 55 This 
analysis from the First Circuit was important in establishing that there 
is a clear constitutional right to record police. However, the fact that 
the court had "no occasion to explore [the] limitations"56 of the rule 
leaves the state of the law somewhat confused. 57 It is unclear whether 
the constitutional right reaches defendants like Hyde, who do fall 
within the statutory scheme. Additionally, the court suggested that 
the rule might not apply in other encounters with the police, specifi-
cally traffic stops, 58 where the encounter could be characterized as an 
"inherently dangerous situation."59 This suggests that the reasoning 
in the Robinson case from Pennsylvania, which grants an exception in 
dangerous situations, may have some undefined role in the constitu-
tional calculus. 
Although the constitutional rule is clear, its application in situa-
tions that are factually distinct from Glik is too unpredictable for it to 
help inform citizens of their rights to record police officers. 
Whether the law is "clearly established" for a § 1983 claim also 
depends on the law of the particular circuit court and the facts of the 
police encounter. In Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, a passenger in a truck 
that was stopped by a police officer recorded the encounter and was 
arrested. 60 The court acknowledged that in the Third Circuit, there 
was enough case law to clearly establish that a police officer has no 
53. Td. at 82. 
54. Td. at 84. 
55. I d. 
56. ld. 
57. See generally Caycee Hampton, Note, Confirmation of a Catch-22: Glik v. Cunniffe and the 
Paradox of Citizen necording, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1549 (2011). 
58. Glik, 655 F.3d at 85 (distinguishing Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 
2010) that determined that the right to film is not clearly established in the context of a traffic 
stop because "a traffic stop is worlds apart from an arrest on the Boston Common"). 
59. !d. (quoting Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
60. 622 F.3d at 251 ~52. 
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"reasonable expectation of privacy when recording conversations 
with suspects."61 However, the arrestee in this case could not recov-
er for the violation of his free speech rights, because "there was in-
sufficient case law establishing a right to videotape police officers 
during a traffic stop to put a reasonably competent officer on 'fair 
notice' that seizing a camera or arresting an individual for videotap-
ing the police during the stop would violate the First Amend-
ment."62 The court reasoned that the decision was "further support-
ed" by the fact that traffic stops have been recognized as "inherently 
dangerous situations," suggesting that even where there is a clearly 
established right, police officers can violate those rights if the situa-
tion is sufficiently dangerous. 63 
Although several cases proclaim the First Amendment right to 
record a police officer while he is carrying out his public duties, the 
case law is too inconsistent and the fact patterns too narrow for a cit-
izen to be able to confidently record police without fear of criminal 
prosecution. Striking a balance between a citizen's right to free 
speech and a police officer's right to safety and privacy further com-
plicates the situation. 
Ill. CONSTITUTIONAL TENSIONS 
Recording statutes present a unique constitutional conundrum 
with a tug-of-war between free speech and legitimate state interests 
in police privacy and safety. The First Amendment likely protects the 
right of the citizen to record police officers. On the other hand, a po-
lice officer's quasi-constitutional right to privacy, which is regularly 
analyzed in a similar way to Fourth Amendment rights to privacy, is 
given great weight by the court. If the court believes that the police 
officer was in a dangerous situation, free speech concerns are given 
even less weight. This is essentially a zero-sum analysis-the more 
the statute protects the First Amendment, the less likely it is to pro-
tect the police officer, and vice versa. Legitimate, although narrow, 
concerns of safety and privacy make it difficult to place a balance 
where each will be appropriately protected. As shown in Part II, state 
statutes vary significantly on the balance between these competing 
constitutional concerns. Statutes that are "privacy centered" are 
61. I d. at 258. 
62. Id. at 262. 
63. Id. 
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more likely to fall on the side of upholding recording statutes that 
protect the privacy of any non-consenting parties, but they also run 
the danger of being applied in violation of a citizen's free speech 
rights. 
Although it might be argued that police should never have a 
right to privacy while performing their public duties, this approach 
would have many of the same problems as privacy centered stat-
utes-free speech would be completely protected, but it would un-
necessarily impede the state from pursuing a legitimate govern-
mental interest. Cases where the value of a citizen's speech is weak 
or de minimus and the argument for police privacy is strong would 
unnecessary suffer under this scheme. Instead, First Amendment 
requirements can be met and the state can adequately protect its 
officers if legislatures carefully strike a balance between these two 
competing interests. This Part will discuss the tension between the 
competing concerns, and finally argue that the best legislative 
schemes would place the balance in the form of a rebuttable pre-
sumption, which would effectively protect speech rights while al-
lowing room to protect officer privacy in appropriate cases. 
A. The First Amendment Right to Record 
Although the text of the First Amendment only specifically pro-
hibits the government from "abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press,"64 the free speech right derived from the First Amend-
ment has been expanded to protect conduct beyond pure speech and 
media outlets. 65 The gathering and dissemination of information is 
implicitly included in the right to free speech.66 This right is particu-
larly important, because the free flow of information about public of-
ficials is vital to the workings of a free democracy.67 In order to pro-
tect the background principle of allowing for a "free discussion of 
governmental affairs," citizens, whether they are members of the 
formal media or not, must have a right incidental to the freedom of 
speech to record governmental officials engaged in their public du-
64. U.S. CONST. amend. l. 
65. See, e.g., Glik v. Cunnifte, 655 F.3d 78, 82-83 (1st Cir. 2011). 
66. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681-82 (1972); Glick, 655 F.3d at 82-83. 
67. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948) (pioneering the theory that speech is essential to representative govern-
ment and democratic decision making). 
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ties. 68 If the information is "about what public officials do on public 
property," and it is a "matter[] of public interest," the gathering of 
that information is protected. 69 
The public's power to gather information about governmental of-
ficials not only is constitutional, but also serves a vital practical pur-
pose by checking the power of government. 70 Vincent Blasi argues 
that this checking value is of paramount importance because "the 
abuse of official power is an especially serious evil-more serious 
than the abuse of private power." 71 These considerations are espe-
cially prevalent in the abuse of police power. First, "the potential 
impact of government on the lives of individuals is unique because of 
its capacity to employ legitimized violence," and second, "public offi-
cials control the resources which, if misused, can do the maximum 
amount of harm.'' 72 Police officers are the public officials that are 
most likely to interact with the public, are the primary enforcers of 
governmentally legitimized violence, and have little oversight com-
bined with great discretion. 73 
The more connected the speech is to matters of public interest, 
especially political interest, the more likely it is that the speech will 
be protected by the First Amendment. For example, in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 74 the Supreme Court held that an individual's 
ability to be sued for libel decreased significantly if the subject of the 
speech was a public official. 75 Although the right of every person to 
be insulated against libel is important, the Court in this case found 
that the right was outweighed by the "profound national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, 
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government 
and public officials.'' 76 The greater the risk of chilling important pub-
68. Glik, 655 F.3d at 83 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
69. Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). 
70. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES.]. 521 (1977). 
71. I d. at 538. 
72. Td. 
73. See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text. 
74. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
75. Td. at 271. 
76. Td. at 270. 
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lie discourse, the more likely it is that First Amendment rights will 
take precedent over other important personal rights, such as the 
right to privacy. 
The Supreme Court has performed a similar analysis regarding 
recording statutes. In Bartnicki v. Vopper, 77 an illegally obtained re-
cording of a phone call between a union president and a union nego-
tiator regarding a matter of public concern was distributed to media 
outlets, which then published the recording.78 Both the federal re-
cording statute and Pennsylvania's recording statute provide that the 
mere disclosure of illegally obtained information is punishable along 
with making the initial recording. 79 The Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that the decision was a difficult one because of the tension be-
tween privacy and free speech.80 The Court held that because the 
publisher had obtained the information lawfully, the publishing of 
that information was protected under the First Amendment because 
the information was of public importance. 81 The Court reasoned that 
in this case, having information about a public issue discussed in the 
public sphere was an important enough interest to justify the loss of 
privacy: "[P]rivacy concerns give way when balanced against the in-
terest in publishing matters of public importance. One of the costs 
associated with participation in public affairs is an attendant loss of 
privacy."82 
Bartnicki protected the publisher of lawfully obtained illegal re-
cordings, but the holding was narrow-the protection did not cover 
the original maker of the recordings. 83 Although the Court decided 
that it was worth the loss of privacy to have the recordings be part of 
the public discussion, if the person who originally made the record-
ing was found, he or she could be prosecuted for violating wiretap-
ping statutes. The First Circuit dealt with a similar issue concerning 
the Massachusetts recording statute in jean v. Massachusetts State Po-
77. 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
78. Jd. at 514. 
79. ld. at 520 n.3. 
80. I d. at 533 (" [T]here are important interests to be considered on both sides of the con-
stitutional calculus."). 
81. ld. at 534-35. 
82. Id. at 534. 
83. Id. at 534-35. The question is "both novel and narrow," applying only to those that 
disclose the contents of an illegally intercepted communication. I d. at 517. 
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lice. 84 In jean, a nanny cam illegally recorded state police officers as 
they arrested Paul Pechonis in his home and then conducted a war-
rantless search of his home.85 Pechonis provided a copl of the re-
cording to Mary T. Jean, who posted it on her website. 6 The First 
Circuit applied a similar reasoning as the Supreme Court in Bartnicki 
and held that a court could reasonably conclude that the First 
Amendment protected the posting of Pechonis's arrest. 87 Unlike the 
recording in the Bartnicki case, which dealt with the privacy of two 
private citizens, the privacy interest of the officers in jean was con-
sidered "virtually irrelevant" because the recording involved "a 
search by police officers of a private citizen's home in front of that 
individual, his wife, other members of the family, and at least eight 
law enforcement officers."88 The parties conceded that the "warrant-
less and potentially unlawful search of a private residence [] is a 
matter of public concem."89 In Bartnicki, the access to public infor-
mation outweighed the privacy rights of two citizens. Therefore, in a 
situation like jean, which dealt with the privacy rights of a law en-
forcement agency, the scales easily tipped in the direction of public 
information, because the facts of the case showed that the privacy 
rights of the police were negligible in that instance.90 
Both Bartnicki and jean focused only on the distributors, not the 
people who originally made the recordings. In fact, the Court in 
Bartnicki explicitly assumed that the statute was constitutionally 
permissible as to the recorders.91 This conclusion was assumed 
without analysis and was not related to the case or controversy be-
fore the court, and is therefore clearly dicta. The Court's own reason-
ing utilized in Bartnicki and jean-balancing the benefit to the public 
against the interests in protecting the privacy of the recorded party-
actually suggest that in the context of police recordings, many wire-
tapping statutes should be held constitutionally impermissible. The 
84. 492 F.3d 24 (lst Cir. 2007). 
85. Id. at 25. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 30. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001) ("We assume that those [substantial 
governmental interests] adequately justify the prohibition in § 2511 (1) (d) against the intercep-
tor's own use of information that he or she acquired."). 
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value to the public remains unchanged whether the recorder or the 
distributor is prosecuted, so therefore the First Amendment side of 
the calculus is just as strong. The jean court made it clear that the 
governmental interest in protecting the privacy rights of police dur-
ing the course of an arrest is not significant enough to impair speech 
rights, so therefore the privacy side of the calculus is weak.92 The 
reasoning of Bartnicki and jean, although not squarely about record-
ers, strongly suggests that recorders of police activity could not be 
constitutionally restrained. 
B. The Right to Privacy 
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."93 In Katz v. 
United States, 94 Justice Stewart explained that the Fourth Amend-
ment "protects individual privacy against certain kinds of govern-
mental intrusion."95 The Court specifically denied that this privacy is 
attached to a "constitutionally protected area," but instead held that 
" [ w] hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. 
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible 
to the public, may be constitutionally protected."96 After Justice 
Stewart clarified the right derived from the Amendment, the concur-
rence written bf Justice Harlan elucidated his understanding of the 
majority rule.9 Justice Harlan explained that the rule for when 
something is protected as private by the Fourth Amendment is a 
"twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual 
92. It should be remembered that in Bartnicki, the governmental interest at stake was to 
protect the privacy of entirely private citizens engaging in what they thought was a private tele-
phone call, and so the Court's assumption that the recorder could be constitutionally protected 
was based on entirely different "significant governmental interests" than the interests in police 
recording contexts. The Court found that the interests served by the statute were "the interest in 
removing an incentive for parties to intercept private conversations, and second, the interest in 
minimizing the harm to persons whose conversations have been illegally intercepted." Id. at 529. 
These interests are significantly weaker when the parties the government is aiming to protect are 
law enforcement personnel engaging with the public. 
93. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
94. 389 u.s. 347 (1967). 
95. Id. at 350. 
96. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted). 
97. I d. at 361 (Harlan,]., concurring). 
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(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation 
be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'98 
Where a man exposes "objects, activities, or statements . . . to the 
'plain view' of outsiders" exhibiting "no intention to keep them to 
himself," there is likely no expectation of privacy. 99 
The Fourth Amendment protects the right to privacy from gov-
ernmental intrusion. However, the rationale behind the Fourth 
Amendment extends to encounters beyond those with the govern-
ment, resulting in a strong public policy against violating the privacy 
of individuals, even when the privacy is violated by other individuals. 
These privacy rights are usually established by statute, as evidenced 
by the many state wiretapping statutes that protect conversations 
conducted with a reasonable expectation of privacy, 100 and common 
law torts such as libel and violations of publicity. Although it is not 
clearly a constitutional violation when a conversation is recorded by 
a non-governmental entity, privacy concerns, as developed in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, are repeatedly analyzed in wiretapping 
cases, suggesting that they are important enough to weigh heavily 
against First Amendment rights in many instances. 
Where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy that meets 
Justice Harlan's two-fold test in Katz (that the individual manifest an 
expectation of privacy and that the expectation is reasonable), it is 
important to understand under what circumstances this privacy right 
impedes on First Amendment speech rights. In this case, the gov-
ernment is regulating conduct that it is generally within the police 
powers to regulate (how individuals interact with law enforcement), 
but this conduct regulation incidentally burdens free speech. Accord-
ing to First Amendment jurisprudence, governments may only inci-
dentally impede speech rights, by means such as recording laws, if it 
can show that the regulation (1) is within the power of the Govern-
ment; (2) furthers an important or substantial governmental inter-
est; and (3) the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms 
"is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." 101 
Here, wiretapping statutes are undoubtedly within the police power 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
1 00. See supra Part !I.A. 
101. U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
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of the government, and the "substantial government interest" 102 the 
states mean to further is the privacy rights of citizens, and in cases 
involving police officers, the privacy rights and safety of the officers. 
Therefore, the first two elements of this test are likely met. However, 
in order for a conduct-based statute that incidentally burdens speech 
to be constitutional, it must not burden speech any more than is "es-
sential" to protect police officers. This Comment argues that many of 
these statutes are unconstitutional, because they fail this element 
and prohibit far more speech than is necessary to protect either the 
safety or the privacy of police officers. 
These two important rights are in opposition in the case of citi-
zens recording police officers. When First Amendment rights to rec-
ord are strengthened, privacy of officers is necessarily diminished; 
when the privacy rights of officers are strengthened, the ability of in-
dividuals to record police officers as part of the First Amendment 
checking power weakens. Understanding the circumstances under 
which either of these rights may be strengthened at the expense of 
the other is important to creating a rule that strikes an appropriate 
balance. A rule with the correct balance will protect as many and sac-
rifice as few rights as possible, yet at the same time be clear enough 
to allow citizens and police officers to exercise their rights confident-
ly. Part IV proposes a rule that is likely to meet all of these goals. 
IV. A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF CITIZEN 
RECORDERS 
As written, many state recording statutes, as discussed in Part II, 
demonstrably have violated, or are in danger of violating the First 
Amendment, because they restrict more speech than is necessary. 
However, police officers as citizens are entitled to privacy when their 
expectation of privacy is reasonable. Therefore, states must deter-
mine how much restriction of speech is "necessary" to protect priva-
cy. In order to walk the line between two strong canons of rights, 
legislatures in states with recording statutes that do not require a 
reasonable expectation of privacy should amend their laws to include 
one. In addition, all of the state legislatures should amend their re-
102. The Supreme Court has observed two general interests that are served by wiretapping 
statutes. "[F]irst, the interest in removing an incentive for parties to intercept private conversa-
tions, and second, the interest in minimizing the harm to persons whose conversations have 
been illegally intercepted." Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001). 
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cording laws to include an express "rebuttable presumption" that 
while in the course of their official duties police officers have no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. 
A rebuttable presumption benefits citizen recorders by prevent-
ing them from being arrested for recording a police officer. This is 
valuable, because many citizens will not record, and their speech will 
be chilled, if they perceive that there is a material risk of criminal 
prosecution. 103 The rebuttable presumption also benefits the officer, 
who would have an opportunity to prove, after the fact, that he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and thus justify the prosecution of 
the recorder. 
This presumption must be strong enough to not allow rebuttal in 
any situation where a police officer is interacting with the public in 
her official capacity. If it is not, it will be no more useful than a gen-
eral rule, such as the rule in Washington, that police officers are not 
entitled to privacy while engaging in their public duties. Instead, re-
buttal should be allowed in very marginal cases where the argument 
is very strong that the police officer probably did expect his actions 
to be private and the value of the information to the public is low. 
There should be very few or no situations where a citizen would be 
surprised to learn that he is being prosecuted under the wiretapping 
law because the law enforcement officer has overcome the rebuttable 
presumption. Because a rebuttable presumption sets the bar higher 
than a general rule, it will be more difficult to get citizen recording 
cases past the summary judgment stage, and it will be possible to 
more easily predict the outcome of these cases without having to 
have lengthy discovery or litigation on the facts. 
A. Problems with Existing Statutes and Other Proposed Solutions 
The statutory schemes addressing this problem have been dis-
cussed at length in Part II, but generally attempt to address the prob-
lem by: (1) relying only on a reasonable expectation of privacy re-
quirement, 104 (2) using a reasonable expectation of privacy 
103. Hampton, supra note 57, at 1559 ("If citizens believe----correctly or otherwise------that it 
is illegal to record unethical police behavior, the potential for vigilante filming diminishes, and 
an important check on governmental authority diminishes correspondingly."). 
104. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; Dina Mishra, Note, Undermining Excessive Pri-
vacy for Police: Citizen Tape Recording to Check Police Officers' Power, 117 YALE L.J. 1549, 1555 (2008) 
("[S]tates should explicitly permit citizens to record police communications other than those 
uttered with the reasonable expectation that they would not be recorded."). 
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requirement coupled with a rule that police generally do not have a 
right to privacy in their public duties, 105 (3) determining whether 
conversations are protected based on whether the recording is secret 
or open, 106 and ( 4) prohibiting all recording, regardless of whether 
there was a reasonable expectation of privacy or the recording was 
made openly. 107 Another proposed solution has been to enact a 
blanket rule that police officers are never entitled to privacy when 
acting within the scope of their duties. 108 
1. Reasonable expectation of privacy 
Statutes such as Pennsylvania's, which determine whether 
speech is protected based on whether there is a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, are useful to a limited extent but are not ideal. The 
biggest danger from such statutes is that citizens may not know 
whether they are allowed to record or not. Whether courts have de-
cided that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in cases de-
cided under these statutes is very fact specific and is analyzed sepa-
rately for each case. Factors such as whether the encounter was on a 
street or in a home, whether there were bystanders present, and the 
volume at which the conversation was conducted are all relevant in-
quiries when determining whether there was a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. 109 If the determinations are so ad hoc, it is difficult 
for both police officers and citizens to shape their behavior, because 
the determination about whether the police officer has a right to pri-
vacy is not made until the case is litigated. This results in the chilling 
of protected First Amendment speech, which consequently decreases 
the political and social benefits of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open" 110 public discourse. Additionally, lengthy litigation is not ideal 
for either the officer or the citizen because of prohibitive costs. Fur-
thermore, if the citizen is arrested because an officer is unsure 
whether he has a reasonable expectation of privacy, it may open the 
I 05. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
106. See supra notes I 0-11 and accompanying text. 
107. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
108. Alderman, supra note 4, at 489 ("[T]he right of citizens to record police officers per-
forming their public duties, without fear of punitive and retaliatory prosecution, must be ex-
pressly safeguarded in state wiretapping statutes."). 
109. See generally Agnew v. Dupler, 717 A.2d 519 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth v. Henlen, 
564 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1989). 
110. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
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officer and the city up to potential liability for violation of constitu-
tional rights under§ 1983. 
2. Reasonable expectation of privacy plus general rule against police privacy 
In general, rules regarding whether police are able to entertain 
a reasonable expectation of privacy turn on whether the officer was 
engaged in public business in a public space. 111 This rule is both 
open to too much interpretation and does not reach far enough to 
adequately protect citizens who wish to record their conversations 
with law enforcement. Although there are many places that are de-
finitively "public," such as Boston Common in the Glik case, 112 and 
there are some places that are clearly private, such as one's own 
home, there is also a wide spectrum of places that are located 
somewhere in between public and private. Even in situations where 
it is unclear whether the space is public or private, it is still unlike-
ly that a police officer interacting with a citizen should have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. This spectrum also applies to an of-
ficer being engaged in "public business." That is, in addition to the 
many situations where officers are clearly engaged in official con-
duct, such as questioning a witness, there are many other gray are-
as where citizens may be unsure of their protection, such as when 
an off-duty officer intervenes in a situation. It is often in these gray 
areas, where police officers are engaging in questionable or border-
line conduct, that unethical police behavior happens. These situa-
tions are where the individual's interest in having her free speech 
protected is at its maximum, and the balance weighs most heavily 
toward protection. 
Even if it were easy to identify which spaces were public and 
which spaces were private, there is still a danger that a police of-
ficer would engage in unethical behavior in a private place. In jean 
v. Massachusetts State Police, 113 for example, the unlawful behavior of 
police officers occurred entirely within the home of the citizen who 
was subjected to a warrantless search and arrest. 114 Under this 
rule, such a citizen whose nanny cam recorded the encounter would 
111. See supra Part ll.A. 
112. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011). 
113. 492 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2007). 
114. Id. at 25. 
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still be criminally liable for recording what happened in his own 
home. 
3. Secrecy requirement 
The statutes that do not protect recordings that are made in se-
cret but do protect recordings that are made openly are constitution-
ally problematic. The requirement of secrecy is an unworkable, arbi-
trary delineation. The different outcome in Glik 115 versus Hyde 116 has 
no logical constitutional explanation. Both Glik and Hyde attempted 
to record abusive conduct by police officers, a matter of public im-
portance. The privacy interests held by the police at the time were 
both negligible because they were acting in a public space and were 
exposing themselves "to the 'plain view' of outsiders" and had ex-
hibited "no intention to keep [their conduct] to [themselves]." 117 
The fact that Simon Glik carried his recording device openly118 and 
Michael Hyde activated his hand-held tape recorder "unbeknownst 
to the officers" 119 has no bearing on either the Katz analysis of 
whether the officers had a reasonable expectation of privacy, or the 
Bartnicki and jean analysis of whether the information was important 
enough to the public discourse to override a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. 
These secrecy statutes are the most constitutionally problematic 
because they have a demonstrable propensity to arbitrarily deprive 
some citizen recorders of their First Amendment rights and not oth-
ers. Additionally, because the statutes do not include any expecta-
tion of privacy requirement, it is difficult to argue that the purpose 
of the statute is to protect the privacy of the law enforcement offic-
ers. The only consideration that matters for the purpose of these 
statutes is whether the recording is surreptitious or open, ignoring 
both the First Amendment and Fourth Amendment concerns. This 
inevitably deprives civilians like Michael Hyde of their First Amend-
ment rights at the cost of overprotecting the governmental interest 
in police officers. Here, the statute fails the requirements of a con-
duct restriction that burdens free speech, because it is not "narrowly 
115. Glik, 655 F.3d 78. 
116. Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963 (Mass. 2001). 
117. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 317, 361 (1967) (Harlan,]., concurring). 
118. Glik, 655 F .3d at 80. 
119. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 965. 
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tailored" to serve the governmental interest and restricts much more 
speech than is necessary to keep police officers safe. 120 
4. Prohibiting all recording regardless of privacy or secrecy 
The statutory scheme in Illinois, which restricts all recordings 
regardless of secrecy or privacy, has many of the same constitutional 
problems as the Massachusetts statutory scheme. Illinois has made 
this extreme prohibition of all recordings despite the unnecessarily 
high cost to the freedom of speech. Some argue that protecting pri-
vacy to such a degree is necessary to protect privacy rights, including 
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit: "If you permit the au-
dio recordings, they'll [sic] be a lot more eavesdropping. . . . 
There's going to be a lot of this snooping around by reporters and 
bloggers .... Yes, it's a bad thing. There is such a thing as priva-
cy."121 The major constitutional problem with this approach is that 
it protects privacy at all costs even where the Supreme Court has 
clearly articulated that privacy considerations must give way, for ex-
ample, where they are "balanced against the interest in publishing 
matters of public importance." 122 
This statute was challenged by the American Civil Liberties Un-
ion of Illinois in 2012. 123 The ACLU wished to begin a "police ac-
countability program," in which it would make audiovisual record-
ings of police officers who were in public places and speaking at a 
120. Potts v. City of Lafayette, 121 F.3d 1106, 1111 (1997) (citing Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
121. Natasha Korecki, judge Casts Doubt on ACLU Challenge to Law Forbidding Audio Recording 
of Cops, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.suntimes.com/news/crime/7639298-
418/j u dge-cas ts-dou bt -on -ad u -challenge-to-law-forbidding-audio-recording -of-cops. h tml. When 
this statute was later challenged in the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner again voiced his concern 
for the privacy of officers: 
Privacy is a social value. And so, of course, is public safety ... [A)n officer 
may freeze if he sees a journalist recording a conversation between the officer 
and a crime suspect, crime victim, or dissatisfied member of the public. He may 
be concerned when any stranger moves into earshot, or when he sees a record-
ing device (even a cell phone, for modern cell phones are digital audio recorders) 
in the stranger's hand. To distract police during tense encounters with citizens 
endangers public safety and undermines effective law enforcement. 
ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner,]., dissenting), cert. denied, 153 S. Ct. 
657, No. 12-318,2012 WL4050487 (Nov. 26, 2012). 
122. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001). 
123. ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 153 S. Ct. 657, No. 12-
318,2012 WL4050487 (Nov. 26, 2012). 
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volume audible to bystanders. 124 The ACLU sued for declaratory and 
injunctive relief that would prohibit the state from enforcing the 
statute against them. 125 The Seventh Circuit unequivocally held that 
"[a]udio recording is entitled to First Amendment protection," and 
that the First Amendment interests at stake were "quite strong." 126 
The court determined that the O'Brien standard applied, and required 
that the "burden on First Amendment rights must not be greater 
than necessary to further the important governmental interest at 
stake."127 The Illinois statute failed this test. The state's interest in 
protecting the privacy of the officers were weak, because the record-
ings would have been of public conversations where the officers had 
no reasonable expectation of privacy, 128 and the statute burdened 
"far more" speech than necessary to protect legitimate privacy inter-
ests.129 
The Illinois statute flatly bans all recordings that are made with-
out total consent of all participants. This burdens a large amount of 
protected speech without providing ample alternative methods of 
communication. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court has con-
sidered the constitutional calculus and determined that free speech 
that facilitates "participation in public affairs" is worth at least some 
"attendant loss ofprivacy." 130 
5. Blanket rule that police may never have an expectation of privacy when 
acting in their official capacity131 
Although this rule gets closest to the benefits that come from a 
rebuttable presumption, it reaches too far and leaves no room for 
more extreme cases. There may be situations where police officers 
are acting within their official duty in technical terms, but the cir-
cumstances clearly show that their expectation of privacy was rea-
sonable and the cost of a citizen recording them was simply too high. 
124. ld. at 588. 
125. ld. 
126. ld. at 597. 
127. ld. at 605. 
128. id.at 605-06. 
129. !d. at 586. 
130. Id. 
131. Alderman, supra note 4, at 489. 
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Situations such as these will be discussed later in the section about 
possible rebuttable situations. 132 
B. Benefits of a Rebuttable Presumption 
A strong presumption in favor of the citizen in police officer re-
cordings will effectively tip the balance of power in favor of those 
that are more vulnerable. Situations in which the police interact with 
civilians are ones in which power is skewed heavily in favor of the 
police officer, resulting in a significant danger for abusive behav-
ior.133 This power balance tips even further in the direction of the 
law enforcement officer in the context of a traffic stop, the situation 
in which most citizens encounter the police. 134 The police officer in 
this situation has a very large amount of discretion, 135 and citizens 
may either be unaware of their rights or unintentionally give up 
some of their rights by granting the officer permission to search their 
car. 136 There is little to no oversight to "restrict[] these police pow-
ers from being utilized as a pretext for criminal investigation, as a 
132. See infra Part Ill. C. 
133. See Hampton, supra note 57, at 1559 ("Freedom of expression has particular signifi-
cance with respect to government because it is here that the state has a special incentive to re-
press opposition and often wields a more effective power of suppression. This is particularly true 
of law enforcement officials, who are granted substantial discretion that may be misused to de-
prive individuals of their liberties." (quoting Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79-80 (1st Cir. 
2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); David T. McTaggart, Note, Reciprocity on the Streets: 
Reflections on the Fourth Amendment and the Duty to Cooperate with the Police, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1233, 
1241-1242 (2001) ("There is always a risk that [officers] might make impassioned decisions in 
the heat of the moment that might prove 'unreasonable' in retrospect. When an overzealous po-
lice officer does not need to overcome procedural requirements before intruding upon an indi-
vidual's liberty, the risk that he might abuse his authority becomes very real."); Mishra, supra 
note 104. 
134. Illya Lichtenberg, Police Discretion and Traffic Enforcement: A Government of Men°, 50 Cl.EV. 
ST. L. REV. 425, 429 (2003) (estimating that "there are over one hundred million traffic stops 
each year in the United States"). 
135. For example: 
Once a motorist is lawfully stopped, police, without any suspicion beyond the initial 
traffic offense, may order a driver and passenger from the vehicle and request consent 
to search the vehicle. Consent is virtually always given, and the scope of the search 
justified by the consent is limited only by what the police are looking for, which is 
almost always drugs. Therefore the police can search anywhere once consent is ob-
tained. In addition, police are not required to inform motorists that they can refuse 
consent .... They may also issue a summons, arrest the motorist, give a written or 
verbal warning, or do nothing at all. 
Id. at 431-32. 
136. See id. at 431. 
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means of retaliating against an uncooperative motorist, or simply se-
lectively enforcing the law [.] "13 7 
This presumption also increases the chances that citizens will 
create evidentiary records of their encounters that are beneficial to 
both police and citizens. When a constitutional violation has actually 
occurred, the evidentiary record is very helpful to citizens bringing 
suit under § 1983, as such suits often turn on whether the jury be-
lieves the plaintiff or the officer. 138 It would also help to insulate the 
majority of officers who perform their jobs lawfully by supplying evi-
dentiary material to defend against accusations of misconduct. 
Wherever there is a factual dispute as to the events that took place 
during an interaction with a police officer and a citizen, a rule that 
incentivizes the creation of more evidentiary records will be benefi-
cial to all parties involved. Police departments themselves have been 
increasingly using cameras to record their interactions with the pub-
lic in order to shield themselves from false accusations of miscon-
duct.139 
The most important advantage this rule has when compared to 
other proposed solutions is that it provides the greatest amount of 
clarity to the citizen. If the bar for an enforcement officer to show a 
reasonable expectation of privacy is high, it is much safer for the citi-
zen to take the risk to record an encounter with the police. Addition-
ally, if the police know that the wiretapping law can only be used to 
arrest citizens in truly exceptional circumstances, they will be less 
likely to risk arresting someone who is simply annoying them under 
the pretext of arresting them for violating the recording law. Addi-
tionally, clarity in the law is helpful not only for enforcement officers 
and citizens when they are making decisions, but it is also invaluable 
for purposes of litigating a § 1983 claim. If a citizen is arrested un-
der a wiretapping law for recording a police officer, it will be much 
137. Id. at 433. 
138. Mishra, supra note 104, at 1554 ("When plaintiffs do bring§ 1983 actions, they face 
significant evidentiary hurdles. Civil juries tend to trust police officers' testimony over suspected 
criminals' testimony. Where courts permit citizen recordings to be introduced as evidence, the 
recordings powerfully rebut jury bias favoring police credibility."). 
139. See David A. Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn Video Devices (Head Cams) as Tools for Ensur-
ing Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 357, 360-364 (2010); Lisa A. 
Skehill, Note, Cloaking Police Misconduct in Privacy: Why the Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Statute 
Should Allow for the Surreptitious Recording of Police Officers, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981, 1007 (2009) 
(describing the benefits that flow to both civilians and law enforcement officers when recordings 
are more available). 
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easier for that civilian to succeed in a claim for damages under 
§ 1983. This will provide an incentive for police officers who wish to 
avoid liability by only arresting citizens in truly exceptional circum-
stances. Although Glik v. Cunniffe140 established that the right to rec-
ord police officers is clearly established in the First Circuit, other cir-
cuits see the rip,ht as being less clearly established for purposes of 
§ 1983 claims. 41 If the states were to amend their statutes to in-
clude this rebuttable presumption, the law would be much more 
likely to be "clearly established" in all of the circuit courts. Uniformi-
ty in interpreting such an important constitutional principle is desir-
able so that citizens can be sure of their rights. Clarity would also 
benefit the police in § 1983 suits, because an officer will not pursue 
lengthy and costly litigation to defend a § 1983 claim unless the cir-
cumstances were exceptional enough to show that a reasonable of-
ficer in his position would not have known that the action was a 
constitutional violation. 142 
C. Possible Rebuttable Situations 
Because of the impossibility of foreseeing all possible situations 
where a citizen may record a police officer while the officer is in the 
course of his public business, a safety valve is necessary for a strong 
rule to be effective and not produce absurd results. Although the bar 
for rebutting the presumption should be quite high, it is still possi-
ble that there will be unusual cases where the police officer can suc-
cessfully argue that he enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
One such situation may be where a police officer was acting un-
dercover and encountered a citizen who then recorded the encounter. 
The citizen's free speech rights are weak, because the citizen would 
likely not know that the person they recorded was a police officer and 
will have the same expectations about recording them as they would 
when recording any other citizen. The governmental interest in the 
privacy of the law enforcement officer is significant, because it is es-
140. 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011). 
141. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 258, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating "it 
was . . . clearly established that police officers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
when recording conversations with suspects," but "there was insufficient case law establishing a 
right to videotape police officers during a traffic stop to put a reasonably competent officer on 
'fair notice' that seizing a camera or arresting an individual for videotaping police during the 
stop would violate the First Amendment"). 
142. See id. at 255. 
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sential to the ability of the police officer to do his or her job effectively. 
In such a situation, the officer's privacy is linked to his safety on the 
job as well as the safety of the community he is working to protect. 
The officer's safety should be a consideration in determining 
whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy only if the loss 
of privacy would cause the loss in safety. This would mean that there 
is a strong governmental interest in protecting the privacy of the of-
ficer in order to keep him safe. A situation where an officer is work-
ing undercover may be one of these situations. However, the mere 
fact that a situation is dangerous is not justification for arresting a 
citizen with a recorder under a wiretapping statute. Some courts 
have suggested that where police officers are in a dangerous situa-
tion, they can make such arrests in order to control the situation. For 
example, in Hornberger v. American Broadcasting Cos., the court consid-
ered whether the police officers had reasonable concern for their 
safety after the suspect in a traffic stop said that he disliked cops. 143 
Although this may have made the law enforcement officers feel less 
safe about the situation, the fact that the encounter was being rec-
orded without their knowledge would not have changed the safety of 
the situation. This kind of situation should not be used to tip the 
scales in favor of rebutting the presumption and arresting the sus-
pect because he was recording them. It was the language of the sus-
pect that may have created a dangerous situation. The recording had 
no bearing on whether the situation was dangerous or not. 
Other possible circumstances where police officers may enjoy a 
reasonable expectation of privacy while engaging in public business 
are situations where officers must discuss confidential information 
with a civilian, discuss a case that has not been released to the pub-
lic, or discuss a plan to apprehend a suspect. These are the types of 
conversations in which there is a strong governmental interest in 
maintaining confidentiality and privacy, even though the police offic-
ers are engaged in public business. 
Finally, there may be situations where police officers are techni-
cally doing public business, but their actions are of the kind where 
they would not anticipate interacting with anyone in the public. 
These include meetings with other police officers, superiors, or rep-
resentatives from other agencies. If a citizen happens to become a 
party to one of these conversations, the context of the conversation 
143. 799 A.2d 566, 576 (N.j. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
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should indicate that this is a situation where the police have an ex-
pectation that they will not be recorded and that expectation is justi-
fiable. 
In summary, situations where the presumption can be rebutted 
are rare. This rarity is in the best interest of the public so that citi-
zens can be confident about their rights, but the ability of a police 
officer to rebut the presumption is important to allow for unforeseen 
or extraordinary events where it is clear that the officer had a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Recording statutes present a difficult problem where two im-
portant sets of rights will inevitably come into conflict. When mak-
ing the judgment about which right should be protected at the ex-
pense of the other, we should prefer the right that is most central to 
the workings of a free democracy. Unless the public has the oppor-
tunity to observe and disseminate information about their govern-
ment officials, we will lose an important checking power to keep po-
lice officers and their superiors from abusing their power. Without 
that right, the public would continue to be vulnerable to all of the 
unethical and abusive conduct perpetrated by law enforcement that 
has been caught on tape throughout the years. The right must be 
preserved even at the expense of the rights of the government offi-
cials whose privacy may be infringed on. However, where infringing 
on those rights is not necessary to preserving a full and robust public 
dialogue, privacy rights should be protected as vigorously as speech 
rights. When legislatures strike a careful balance, they can avoid 
many rules that are over- or under-inclusive and secure as many 
rights for as many people as possible. 
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